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THE CLAIM-CENTERED APPROACH TO ARISING-
UNDER JURISDICTION: A BRIEF REJOINDER TO 
PROFESSOR MULLIGAN 
Simona Grossi* 
My claim-centered approach to arising-under jurisdiction fully 
embraces the three subcategories of jurisdiction that Professor Mulligan 
identifies.1 My essential point is that the bifurcation (or trifurcation as 
Professor Mulligan suggests) into separate doctrines has led to a 
mechanical jurisprudence that is sometimes inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles that ought to animate § 1331 jurisdictional 
analysis. In my view, Gully v. First National Bank2 illuminates those 
fundamental principles by focusing on the role of the federal issue in the 
case before the court.3 That does not mean that Gully provides an easy 
answer for all applications of arising-under jurisdiction; it does mean, 
however, that Gully points to the fundamental question presented in the 
jurisdictional analysis. 
Professor Mulligan suggests that the Gully standard I endorse requires 
an abstract consideration of the issue’s importance presented in the 
case.4 But this is not my view. As I explained in my article, Gully’s 
“importance” inquiry pertains solely to the role that the federal issue 
plays in the plaintiff’s claim: Does it lurk in the background or does it 
operate in the foreground as an essential element of that claim? In fact, 
one of my chief criticisms of the “rights separation” model advocated by 
Professor Mulligan is that, as presently configured, it invites a subjective 
determination of the importance of the federal issue to the federal 
system, a determination that I believe is inappropriate to the 
jurisdictional question.5 My objection to the current bifurcated doctrinal 
* © 2013 Simona Grossi. Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, J.S.D., U.C. 
Berkeley School of Law, LL.M., U.C. Berkeley School of Law, J.D., L.U.I.S.S. Guido Carli, Rome, 
Italy. 
1. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Gully and the Failure to Stake a 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “Claim,” 89 
WASH. L. REV. 441 (2014). 
2. 299 U.S. 109 (1936). 
3. Id. at 114–15. 
4. See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 1, at 459–60, 480. 
5. See Simona Grossi, A Modified Theory of the Law of Federal Courts: The Case of Arising-
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approach is that, differently from my proposed unified model, it relies on 
a subjective determination of whether the issue is somehow important as 
perceived by the individual judge. 
Professor Mulligan also argues that the Gully approach “leads to 
unclear—meaning unpredictable ex ante—§ 1331 doctrine.”6 But he 
provides no proof of that claim other than the assertion that other 
commentators have assumed that to be the case.7 In fact, Gully pinpoints 
the essential jurisdictional question, i.e., the role of the federal issue 
within the context of the claim asserted, and numerous cases preceding 
Gully fully illuminate how that principle had been applied.8 Thus, there 
was no reason for the cases following Gully to stray from that course. 
Parts III through VI of my article examine and critique the consequences 
of straying from Gully’s principled approach.9 My primary concern with 
Professor Mulligan’s approach is that it conforms too easily to the 
current jurisprudence of arising-under jurisdiction without addressing its 
defects. 
Of course, my claim-centered approach does fully embrace causes of 
action, rights, and federal common law. The difference between my 
approach and Professor Mulligan’s approach is that I do not see those 
descriptive categories as calling for distinct doctrinal developments. 
Instead, the analysis should gravitate around the essential, fundamental 
question: Is the plaintiff’s claim truly about federal law? This question is 
consistent with the text of § 1331, the contemporaneous interpretations 
of that text, and the intent of Congress. It is also consistent with a federal 
court’s obligation to exercise the jurisdiction Congress has conferred 
upon it.10 This approach also has the benefit of avoiding the necessity of 
drawing clean distinctions among causes of action, rights, and common 
law principles. Gully’s fundamental question is neither vague nor 
difficult to apply. For the claim is truly about federal law when the 
plaintiff needs to plead and prove an issue of federal law to prevail. 
Finally, I do agree that a claim-centered jurisdictional inquiry 
resembles the question of whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon 
Under Jurisdiction, 88 WASH. L. REV. 961, 992, 997–99, 1003, 1114–17 (2013). 
6. See Mulligan, supra note 1, at 482. 
7. Id. n.218. 
8. Gully, 299 U.S. at 112 (citing Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248, 257 (1885); First Nat’l Bank 
v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504, 512 (1920)). 
9. See Grossi, supra note 5, at 987–1013. 
10. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8 (1983) 
(discussing federal courts’ obligation to decide cases). 
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which relief can be granted.11 However, the latter consideration involves 
whether a claim has been stated, the former involves whether that claim 
belongs in federal courts. 
11. See Mulligan, supra note 1, at 442–43 (discussing Grossi, supra note 5). 
 
                                                     
